Abstract:Considering the two-level traceable agricultural supply chain composed of e-commerce platforms and suppliers, the pricing decision problem of the traceable agricultural supply chain is studied by constructing the pricing decision model of e-commerce platform without/with preferences. The influence of government subsidies, altruistic preference and consumer traceability on the performance of agricultural supply chain members and overall is discussed by using Stackelberg Game Theory. The results show that the altruistic preference of e-commerce platform is helpful to increase the traceability of agricultural supply chain and improve the overall performance; Consumers’ traceability preference could improve the retail price, but its influence on the profits of e-commerce platform is also related to the altruistic preference degree; The pricing strategy of e-commerce platform not only depends on its own altruistic preference, but also is affected by the government subsidies and consumers’ traceability preference; Compared with the supplier as the channel follower, the profits of dominant e-commerce platforms may not always be higher.