Abstract：Due to the excessive pressure of local financial payment, the key to win-win cooperation between government and enterprises is to formulate a reasonable subsidy mechanism to stimulate manufacturers to green R&D spending. In this study, an evolutionary game model of enterprise R&D and government subsidies is established from the perspective of peer incentives. Combining the two scenarios of static and dynamic incentives, the local stability in evolutionary game is analyzed, and the effects of factors such as peer incentive funds, subsidy coefficients on the evolutionary path of the group are explored to verify the feasibility of peer incentives at the cooperative mechanism level: lower government subsidy expenditures can still motivate manufacturers to green R&D, while higher government subsidy spending may lead to subsidy trap. The dynamically adjusted peer incentive mechanism can coordinate the unstable cooperative relationship between government and enterprises.
卢超，程海芳，蔡建湖. 同侪激励机制下政府补贴对制造商绿色研发影响的演化博弈分析[J]. 管理学报, 2022, 19(1): 93-.
LU Chao，CHENG Haifang，CAI Jianhu. Evolutionary Game Analysis: Impacts of Government Subsidies on Manufacturers’Green R&D under Peer Incentive Mechanism. Chinese Journal of Management, 2022, 19(1): 93-.
