Abstract：This paper establishes the Stackelberg game model with manufacturers as the leader and retailer as followers, studies the supply chain green decision under the government subsidy strategy and the single subsidy strategy, and analyzes the influence of the external coordination of the government and the internal coordination of the supply chain on the green decision-making. The research shows that the green quality level of manufacturers under the coordinated subsidy strategy is higher than that under the single subsidy strategy, and the green quality level under the internal coordination strategy is higher when consumers have a higher green awareness, but their profit under the external coordination strategy is always optimal. For retailers, the external coordination subsidy strategy is always superior to other subsidy strategies, while the internal coordination strategy is most unfavorable to retailers when consumers are less green. In addition, for social welfare, the coordination subsidy strategy is better than the single subsidy strategy and non-subsidy strategy, and the social welfare under the external coordination strategy is the highest.
曹裕，李青松，胡韩莉. 不同政府补贴策略对供应链绿色决策的影响研究[J]. 管理学报, 2019, 16(2): 297-.
CAO Yu，LI Qingsong，HU Hanli. Research on the Influence of Different Government Subsidy Strategies on the Green Decision-Making of Supply Chain. Chinese Journal of Management, 2019, 16(2): 297-.
