Abstract：For two typical supply chain financing modes for poverty alleviation through “bank financing” and “e-commerce financing”, this study constructs a game model for poverty alleviation supply chain, analyzes the operation mechanism of different financing modes, and proposes the preference conditions of farmers and e-commerce for different financing modes. The analysis results reveal that when there is a large difference between the expected interest rate of the bank and e-commerce, and the farmer’s degree of risk-averse is relatively high, farmers and e-commerce can realize a win-win situation only through the “e-commerce financing” mode, at this time, the e-commerce should provide financing services. And when the farmer’s degree of risk-averse is relatively low, farmers and e-commerce can realize a win-win situation only through the “bank financing” mode. When there is a little difference between the expected interest rate of the bank and e-commerce, farmers and e-commerce can realize a win-win situation through the “e-commerce financing” mode. What’s more, farmers are more likely to choose the “bank financing” mode to realize a win-win situation with the increased social responsibility of the e-commerce.
浦徐进，王艺苗，徐磊. 电商扶贫背景下的农户融资模式选择研究[J]. 管理学报, 2022, 19(8): 1223-.
PU Xujin，WANG Yimiao，XU Lei. Poverty Alleviation through E-Commerce and Financing Mode Selection in the Supply Chain. Chinese Journal of Management, 2022, 19(8): 1223-.
