Abstract：During the special period of a major epidemic, the quality supervision of medical research and reporting is an effective way to ensure the safety of the public and society. Considering the reality of experts refuting rumors, this study constructs a four-party evolutionary game model for government regulators, medical industry alliance, media platforms, and the public. he stability of the game players’ strategic choices, and carry on a stability analysis for possible equilibrium points based on the first law of Lyapunov are analysed. And this studymakes simulation analysis about the influence of key elements on system evolution via using MATLAB 2017. The study shows that: the increase in government penalties for low-quality medical research reports, the increase in the probability of experts refuting rumors, and the increase in the probability of rational identification by the public all can reduce the probability of low-quality research reports; the higher the reputation value, the more medical research institutions and media platforms prefer to carry high-quality medical research and choose to verify reports.
孙淑慧，苏强. 重大疫情期医药研究报道质量监管四方演化博弈分析[J]. 管理学报, 2020, 17(9): 1391-.
SUN Shuhui，SU Qiang. Four-Party Evolutionary Game Analysis of Quality Supervision of Medical Research Reports in Major Epidemic Period. Chinese Journal of Management, 2020, 17(9): 1391-.
