Abstract：In this paper, a reverse supply chain system which consists of a single remanufacturer and two competitive recycling platforms is constructed, introducing bidirectional fairness concerns of the recycling platforms, and three different recycling price models are constructed under three different situations in which the members are neutral and the remanufacturer respectively considers as well as ignores recycling platforms’ behavior of bidirectional fairness concerns. The equilibrium strategy of the members is analyzed by Stackelberg game theory. The results show that excessive competition between the two recycling platforms is unfavorable to the operation of the reverse supply chain; increasing the consumer sensitivity of collection price is favorable to improving the profit and utility of the members; vertical fairness concerns of the two recycling platforms can increase their bargaining power, while horizontal fairness concerns are the opposite; the remanufacturer should consider recycling platforms’ behavior of bidirectional fairness concerns when making decisions, which is favorable to increasing the amount of recycling waste products, the profits and utilities of the members.
