Abstract：The study analyzes and compares the optimal decisions under the wholesale price contract and the buyback contract when the risk averse partners take Stackelberg game and Nash bargaining model. It aims to explore the supply chain leader’s choice of contract and game mechanism according to the risk averse levels of partners. The results show that, ①when the retailer and supplier have the same level of riskaversion, the best choice is the wholesale contract or buyback contract based on Nash bargaining model, both contracts are equivalent;②when the retailer’s risk averse level is close to the supplier’s, the buyback contract based on Nash bargaining model is better than the wholesale price contract with the same game mechanism;③when the difference of risk averse level between the supplier and the retailer is large, the supplier will not choose any contract under the cooperation game, but choose the buyback contract under the Stackelberg game. The conclusion of this study is more consistent with the practice of supply chain management than that of risk neutral hypothesis.
简惠云，许民利. 风险规避下基于Stackelberg博弈与Nash讨价还价博弈的供应链契约比较[J]. J4, 2016, 13(3): 447-.
JIAN Huiyun，XU Minli. Comparison of Supply Chain Contracts Based on Stackelberg Game and Nash bargaining Model with the Assumption of Risk Aversion. J4, 2016, 13(3): 447-.
2016, Vol. 13 
