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J4  2014, Vol. 11 Issue (5): 750-    DOI:
物流与运作管理 最新目录| 下期目录| 过刊浏览| 高级检索 |
基于自执行旁支付契约的供应商与 制造商减排博弈与协调
夏良杰,赵道致,何龙飞,李友东
天津大学管理与经济学部
Game on Carbon Emission Reduction and Coordination Based on SidePayment  SelfEnforcing Contract between Supplier and Manufacture
XIA Liangjie,ZHAO Daozhi,HE Longfei,LI Youdong
Tianjin University, Tianjin, China

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摘要 考虑产品生产过程中碳减排对需求的影响,将碳交易和碳排放约束融入企业利润函数,研究供应商与制造商势之间的减排博弈;设计一种自执行旁支付契约,解决以往旁支付契约供应链协调过于强调博弈参与方自发参与而未能有效考虑系统利润增量分配合理性与公平性的问题,并进行数值分析。研究表明:当制造商和供应商之间为斯坦伯格博弈时,主导者可以通过提高减排量引导跟随者也提高减排量;当制造商和供应商之间执行完全信息静态博弈时,企业可在决策前释放提高减排量的可信信号,使双方都提高减排量;新的旁支付自执行契约,可使决策双方依靠个人理性的分散决策取得集体理性的集中决策效果。
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关键词 碳排放权碳交易分散决策旁支付自执行契约设计供应链协调    
Abstract:In this paper, the effect of carbon emission reduction in the manufacturing process on production demand is emphasized under carbon trading regulation and carbon emissions constraints. A sidepayment selfenforcing contract is designed to resolve the problem that spontaneity of participation in sidepayment contracts design based on supply chain coordination is over emphasized while rationality and fairness of allocation of profit increment is not considered. And the numerical analysis is given. As a result, in Stackelberg game setting, the leader can induce the follower to make bigger cuts in their emissions by increasing its carbon emission reduction; in complete information static state game setting, company can help increase the total carbon emission reduction of the supply chain with a credible signal on improving emission reduction before making a decision; with the new sidepayment selfenforcing contract decentralized decision according to individual rationality incurs a collective reason effect in the centralized setting.
Key wordscarbon permits    carbon trading    decentralized decision    sidepayment selfenforcing contract design    supply chain coordination   
收稿日期: 2012-10-08     
基金资助:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71072155, 71202086)
通讯作者: 夏良杰(1980~),男,湖北石首人。天津大学(天津市 300072)管理与经济学部博士研究生。研究方向为供应链管理。     E-mail: xlj.80@163.net
引用本文:   
夏良杰,赵道致,何龙飞,李友东. 基于自执行旁支付契约的供应商与 制造商减排博弈与协调[J]. J4, 2014, 11(5): 750-. XIA Liangjie,ZHAO Daozhi,HE Longfei,LI Youdong. Game on Carbon Emission Reduction and Coordination Based on SidePayment  SelfEnforcing Contract between Supplier and Manufacture. J4, 2014, 11(5): 750-.
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