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J4  2013, Vol. 10 Issue (4): 583-    DOI:
物流与运作管理 最新目录| 下期目录| 过刊浏览| 高级检索 |
节点企业地位相当时供应链双向激励及协调
黄梅萍,汪贤裕,郭红梅
1.福州大学土木工程学院; 2.四川大学工商管理学院
Double Incentives and Coordination in Supply Chain with Equal Market Power between Supplier and Retailer
HUANG Meiping,WANG Xianyu,GUO Hongmei
1. Fuzhou University, Fuzhou, China; 2. Sichuan University, Chengdu, China

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摘要 在节点企业地位相当的二级供应链中,销售商隐藏努力行动、供应商隐藏成本信息,从而导致供应链效率低下。为此,运用委托代理理论,引入虚拟第三方为协调主体,从供应链整体利益最大化出发,对供应链进行集中控制、利润分配,对供应商和销售商实施双向激励。结果表明,与供应商主导供应链时的情形相比,当销售利润共享比例α和成本共担比例β满足更为苛刻的关系时,供应链才能实现协调。但是,此时的虚拟第三方承认了供应商的信息租金,其决策的角度是供应链期望利润的α倍。最后,通过一个算例对研究结果进行了说明。
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关键词 逆向选择道德风险双向激励供应链协调虚拟第三方委托代理    
Abstract:In a two-stage supply chain, the supplier and retailer are equal in market power. The supplier hides its information about production cost and the retailer hides its action about sales effort, which results in low efficiency of supply chain operation. To cope with this problem, a virtualthird party is introduced to represent the whole interests of the supply chain as coordination main body. The virtualthird party realizes centralized control, profits distribution and double incentives. Main results reveal that compared to the situation in the retailerled supply chain, only when the revenue sharing ratio and cost sharing proportion satisfies the more stringent constraint, the supply chain coordination could be achieved. However, because the virtual thirdparty admits the supplier’s information rent, it made decision on how many times of the whole supply chain’s expected profit. Finally, the study results are illustrated by a numerical example.
Key wordsadverse selection    moral hazard    double incentives    supply chain coordination    virtualthird party    principal agent   
收稿日期: 2011-06-22     
基金资助:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071103);福州大学科研启动资助项目(0460022509);四川大学青年教师科研启动基金资助项目(2012SCU11015)
通讯作者: 汪贤裕(1947~),男,江苏苏州人。四川大学(成都市610064)工商管理学院教授、博士研究生导师。研究方向为博弈论、供应链管理、管理科学。     E-mail: ww08ww@163.com
引用本文:   
黄梅萍,汪贤裕,郭红梅. 节点企业地位相当时供应链双向激励及协调[J]. J4, 2013, 10(4): 583-. HUANG Meiping,WANG Xianyu,GUO Hongmei. Double Incentives and Coordination in Supply Chain with Equal Market Power between Supplier and Retailer. J4, 2013, 10(4): 583-.
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