Abstract：The present study develops three dual-recycling channel models based on considering retailer’s risk aversion in dual-recycling channel closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs) which are led by manufacturers. The Stackelberg game theory is employed and a numerical experiment is conducted to verify the conclusions and for further discussion. The results are proposed as follows: ①The manufacturer can benefit from the retailer’s risk aversion behavior, while the retailer will endure some expected utilities loss. Besides, the retailer’s risk aversion will exert greatly different impacts on the third-party’s optimal expected utilities under different models. ②Regardless of the retailer’s risk aversion degree, both manufacturer and retailer can capture the largest expected utilities and return rates when both of them carry on recycling activities. ③The collection rate is the highest with manufacturer-third-party dual-recycling channel model when the retailer has strong risk aversion attitude. ④The optimal buyback price is greatly affected by the retailer’s risk aversion.
