In the channel relation, manufacturer often conflicts with retailer on benefits. The manufacturer is in weak position against dominant retailers, and has an advantage over weak retailers. The analysis of this paper is based on the following two prerequisites: (1) symmetric and asymmetric retail costs in different periods; (2) dominant retailer regulates the wholesale price while weak retailer accepts wholesale price of manufacturer. Direct-viewing graph and mathematical model are employed in this paper to analyze two strategies of manufacturer-pricing strategy and promotion strategy, and discusses how the manufacturer maximizes its own benefits. The two strategies' effect on the increment of the benefits and the revelation to Chinese retail business under the condition that retailing completely opened and retailers have asymmetrical costs are explored as well.
李骏阳, 夏爱萍. 制造商应对强势零售商的战略反应及对我国零售业开放的启示[J]. J4, 2006, 3(3): 296-.
LI Jun-Yang, XIA Ai-Ping. Manufacturer Response to a Dominant Retailer and The Revelation to Chinese Retail Business under New Condition. J4, 2006, 3(3): 296-.