Abstract：In this study, three recycling decision models are developed with Game Theory, to verify the effectiveness of two subsidy policies based on recycling quantity and battery capacity respectively on improving the recycling rate of new-energy-power battery in closed-loop supply chain. The results are as follows: ① The recycling rate and subsidy coefficient may be negatively correlated under the subsidy policy based on battery capacity; ② The recycling rate is higher under the subsidy policy based on recycling quantity compared with that under no subsidy. On the contrary, the recycling rate may be lower under the subsidy policy based on battery capacity compared with that under no subsidy; ③ The recycling rate under the subsidy policy based on recycling quantity is greater than that based on battery capacity when the total subsidy amount of each subsidy policy is equal. Furthermore, profits of manufacturers are higher under the subsidy policy based on recycling quantity compared with that under the other policy, and retailers and consumers benefit more from the subsidy policy based on battery capacity compared with the other policy, while the level of social welfare under the two subsidy policies is related to the subsidy coefficient.
楼高翔，雷鹏，马海程，万宁. 不同回收补贴政策下新能源汽车动力电池闭环供应链运营决策研究[J]. 管理学报, 2023, 20(2): 267-.
LOU Gaoxiang，LEI Peng，MA Haicheng，WAN Ning. Research on Operation Decision of Closed-Loop Supply Chain of New Energy Vehicle Power Battery under Different Recycling Subsidy Policies. Chinese Journal of Management, 2023, 20(2): 267-.
