Abstract：In the context of information asymmetry about production quality, this study focuses on informational factors such as product videos and development experience, and conducts a dynamic game between a creator and consumers. The research investigates the impact of different participators’ behaviors (information disclosure from a creator and information acquisition from backers) on the optimal design of crowdfunding parameters and the corresponding equilibrium profits. Some results are yielded. When perceived quality is low, crowdfunding parameters only served as quality signals can achieve a separate equilibrium with a lower signal cost. As perceived quality increases, the crowdfunding parameters under participators’ behaviors generate a larger profit. In particular, when the decreasing degree about information disclosure cost or the increasing degree about market size is within a specified range, information disclosure becomes more prominent compared to information acquisition.
曹二保，周颖，郭飞宇. 不对称信息下考虑参与者行为的众筹参数设计[J]. 管理学报, 2022, 19(5): 723-.
CAO Erbao，ZHOU Ying，GUO Feiyu. Designing Reward-Based Crowdfunding Parameters under Participators ‘Behaviors and Information Asymmetry. Chinese Journal of Management, 2022, 19(5): 723-.
