Abstract：Noting the practical observation that firms often need to introduce consumer participation in new product development, this studybuilds a signaling game model to research: ①How can firms encourage consumers’effort behavior through the innovativeness of new product samples? ②How can firms accurately judge the consumers’preference type based on their effort behavior so as to firms can choose whether to produce and sell new products? Based on some technical assumptions, the following main results were obtained. As long as the production cost of the new product is sufficiently high, consumers will truly reveal their preferences in the participation process through their effort behavior; There is a critical level of firms’ innovation capacity, which makes the firms with higher innovation capacity provide the highest innovativeness of new product samples under the constraint of innovation ability. Under the condition that the enterprises provide the highest innovativeness, different innovation capacity will lead to different pricing of innovative products; The critical level of innovation capacity decreases with the increase of consumer product improvement capacity.
张国印,倪得兵,唐小我. 企业创新能力、消费者参与和新产品开发[J]. 管理学报, 2021, 18(2): 253-.
ZHANG Guoyin,NI Debing,TANG Xiaowo. Firm’s Innovation Capacity，Consumer Participation and New Product Development：An Analysis Based on Signaling Game. Chinese Journal of Management, 2021, 18(2): 253-.
