This paper studies the moderating effect of different ultimate controller of listed companies on the relationship between the quantity and the maturity structure of bank loans and their investment behavior in order to reveal the integrative effects of the shareholdercreditor agency conflict and the bank loans as a governance mechanism on the investments. Studies have shown that: i) in general, there is a significant negative correlation between bank lending and investment spending, and shortterm borrowing can exert a more binding force than the longterm borrowing for investment expansion; ii) whether the ultimate controller is state or nonstate, the shortterm debt can constraint the investment expansion more obvious than that of the longterm loan, but in the companies ultimately controlled by the country, the longterm borrowing show the more incentive for the overinvestment; iii) the shortterm borrowings play a role in binding in companies controlled by the central government, but the longterm does not; iv) there isn’t significant relationship between shortterm borrowings and investment behaviors, but there is a significant relation between longterm debt and overinvestment.