Abstract：In order to analyze the influence of corporate’ social responsibility consciousness(SRC),equilibrium decisions under the manufacturer’s two pricing modes, namely uniform pricing and discriminatory pricing, were solved based on the dynamic game theory in a one manufacture-two retailers supply chain (SC) where the manufacturer and one of the retailers are simultaneously socially concerned. It is found that: ① the consumer surplus increases with the SRC of any corporate; ②the manufacturer would lower the wholesale price and the retailer would order more if they are more socially concerned. Neither the self-interested manufacturer nor the self-interested retailer always has the internal impetus to increase his SRC;③moderating SRC could improve the whole SC, and, under some specific conditions, could even lead it to the optimal performance as the centralized case. In the end, numerical examples were given to illustrate the theoretical conclusions.
宋杰珍，黄有方，谷金蔚. 具有社会责任意识的单生产商-两零售商供应链均衡决策研究[J]. J4, 2016, 13(10): 1571-.
SONG Jiezhen，HUANG Youfang，GU Jinwei. On Equilibrium Decisions of Socially Responsible Supply Chain with One Manufacture and Two Retailers. J4, 2016, 13(10): 1571-.
2016, Vol. 13 
