Abstract：Shared express cabinets with lower profits is one of caused by lower rate of users’ openness and utilization. The study starts with the logistics contract, analyzes the evolutionary game strategy of the user and the courier in the two situations of passive acceptance and active cooperation of shared smart cabinet, and finds that there is no evolutionary stable strategy set between the user and the courier. When the shared smart cabinet adopts active cooperation, the user has a greater probability of accepting courier to drop the cabinet. At the same time, upward cooperation can only bring the courier’s unilateral evolutionary strategy to stabilize, without inspiring users; while downward incentives will guide users and couriers to converge. This is a win-win situation for couriers, courier companies, shared smart cabinets and users.
李嘉晨，王艳. 共享智能柜需求差异化的快递终端配送演化博弈研究[J]. 管理学报, 2021, 18(7): 1058-.
LI Jiachen，WANG Yan. Research on the Evolutionary Game of Express Terminal Distribution Based on the Differentiation Demand on Shared Smart Cabinet. Chinese Journal of Management, 2021, 18(7): 1058-.
