Abstract：Based on the product life cycle theory, the competition between the two types of new products with different innovation degrees can be divided into two stages. By analyzing the game relationship of manufacturers and retailers in two stages of the competition, we found that the optimal retail prices of products will be lower and market demand will be greater than that in Manufacturer-dominate Stackelberg game at the early stage of the competition if the dominant manufacturers form Nash game with the retailer. Furthermore, in the market formed by two new products with different innovation degrees, when one party improves the innovation degree of own product, it does not reduce the demand of the other party’s products but can promote the increase of the two products’ demands. Finally, it is observed that the two-parties alliance of manufacturer and retailer can significantly increase the market share of own product at the late stage of the competition, but reduce the profit of manufacturers.
李振东，张慧颖. 两阶段竞争中不同创新度产品的市场博弈分析[J]. 管理学报, 2019, 16(3): 456-.
LI Zhendong，ZHANG Huiying. Market Game Analysis of New Products with Different Innovation Degree under Two-Stage Competition. Chinese Journal of Management, 2019, 16(3): 456-.
