摘要
利用内部人减持规制出台的政策冲击,以2010~2022年A股上市公司为样本,考察监管规制对审计师风险感知的影响。研究发现,规制实施后,审计师对发生减持的客户收取了显著更高的费用。机制检验表明,投资者关注提升是监管规制影响审计定价的重要路径。调节效应分析显示,审计收费上调现象在新任审计业务、无审计委员会连锁关系、百强排名靠前及行业专长较强的事务所中更突出。进一步检验表明,大股东与董监高同期减持或累计减持规模越大,审计溢价越高,但审计机构未甄别减持的机会主义动机;监管规制还提高了减持客户被出具非标意见和审计契约终止的概率。
Abstract
Using the introduction of insider selling regulation as a policy shock, this study examines the impact of regulatory intervention on auditors’ risk perceptions based on a sample of A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2022. The findings indicate that, following the implementation of the regulation, auditors charge significantly higher fees to clients with insider selling. Mechanism tests show that increased investor attention serves as an important channel through which the regulation affects audit pricing. Moderating effect analysis reveals that the increase in audit fees is more pronounced for newly undertaken audit engagements, clients without audit committee interlocking relationships, and audit firms that rank higher among the top 100 and have stronger industry expertise. Further analysis demonstrates that audit premiums are higher when large shareholders and directors, supervisors, and senior executives engage in insider selling during the same period, or when the cumulative scale of insider selling is larger. However, auditors fail to identify the opportunistic motives behind insider selling. The regulation also increases the probability that clients with insider selling receive non-standard audit opinions and that their audit engagements are terminated.
关键词
内部人减持 /
审计收费 /
投资者关注 /
行业专长 /
审计意见
Key words
insider selling /
audit fee /
investor attention /
industry expertise /
audit opinion
冯秋樵.
内部人减持监管规制对审计师风险感知的影响研究[J]. 管理学报. 2026, 23(9): 1761
FENG Qiuqiao.
Research on the Effect of Insider Selling Regulation on Auditors’ Risk Perceptions[J]. Chinese Journal of Management. 2026, 23(9): 1761
{{custom_sec.title}}
{{custom_sec.title}}
{{custom_sec.content}}
基金
国家社会科学基金资助项目(25BTQ050)