基于2013～2023年Ａ股非金融类国有上市公司数据，采用交叠双重差分模型考察国有资本划转对国有企业高管薪酬业绩敏感性的影响。研究发现：国有资本划转通过缓解代理冲突以约束管理层的机会主义行为，以及提高会计信息质量以建立更有效的薪酬契约，这显著提高了国有企业高管薪酬业绩敏感性，且这一现象在竞争性国有企业、管理层不持股和处于较低市场化地区的企业中更加显著。进一步的研究揭示，划转后存在的社保基金、财政厅和国资委3种国有股权管理主体治理模式，对国有企业高管薪酬业绩敏感性的提升作用依次递减。特别地，国有资本划转具有薪酬业绩参照点效应，高管薪酬和经营业绩低于参照点时，对国有企业高管薪酬业绩敏感性的提升作用更强。此外，国有资本划转还抑制了国有企业高管的超额在职消费，提高了国有企业的分红力度。

Using a sample of non-financial state-owned enterprises(SOEs)listed in China’s A-share market from 2013 to 2023,this study employs a staggered difference-in-differences model to examine the impact of the transfer of state-owned capital on executive pay-performance sensitivity in SOEs. The findings show that the transfer of state-owned capital significantly increases executive pay-performance sensitivity in SOEs by alleviating agency conflicts，thereby constraining managerial opportunistic behavior and by improving accounting information quality，thereby facilitating more effective compensation contracts. This effect is more pronounced in competitive SOEs, in firms where management does not hold equity stakes, and in SOEs located in regions with lower levels of marketization. Moreover, the governance effects of the three state-owned equity management models that emerge after the transfer, namely the social security fund model, the finance department model, and the state-owned assets supervision authority model, decrease successively in enhancing executive pay-performance sensitivity in SOEs. Notably, the transfer of state-owned capital exhibits a compensation-performance reference-point effect. When executive compensation and operating performance fall below their respective reference points, its strengthening effect on executive pay-performance sensitivity in SOEs becomes more pronounced. In addition, the transfer of state-owned capital curbs excessive perquisite consumption by executives in SOEs and increases dividend payouts in SOEs.