借助证监会随机抽查场景，探讨无风险导向式监管对债权人定价决策的影响。研究发现，企业被随机抽查后，债权人会要求更高的风险溢价，支持风险揭示效应。机制检验发现，随机抽查会暴露企业违法违规问题，导致审计师、交易所、媒体进一步挖掘企业负面信息，且企业也会增加负面信息披露，进而提高债权人的风险感知和风险溢价。异质性分析发现，随机抽查与债务融资成本的正相关关系在证监会行政处罚公告的信息含量更高、公司信息透明度更低或资产抵押能力较弱的公司中更显著；同时，企业被随机抽查后，不仅债权人会缩减信贷规模，供应商也会缩减商业信用供给。此外，上市公司再次被抽查后，债权人并不会提高风险溢价。

Using the random inspection system implemented by CSRC, this paper examines the impact of risk-free oriented regulation on creditors’pricing decisions. The results show that creditors demand higher risk premiums after listed companies are randomly inspected, supporting the risk disclosing effect. Mechanism analysis finds that random inspections will uncover companies’ illegal and irregular problems, which will lead auditors, exchanges, and the media continuously reveal negative information about the company, and the listed companies themselves also increase the disclosure level of negative information, therefore increase creditors’ risk perception and risk premiums. Cross-sectional analysis finds that the positive effect of random inspection on creditors’ pricing decisions is more pronounced for firms with higher information content in the CSRC’s penalty announcements, lower information transparency, or weaker asset mortgage capacity. Meanwhile, after listed companies are randomly inspected, not only creditors but also suppliers will reduce their credit scale. In addition, creditors do not raise the risk premium after a listed company is subjected to a follow-up random inspection.