基于中国沪深A股上市公司数据，探究了高管相对薪酬水平对高管薪酬粘性的替代效应，以及企业内部监管的调节效应。研究结果发现：高管超额薪酬、内部薪酬差距、外部薪酬差距对高管薪酬粘性具有替代效应；当内部控制质量较高时，高管超额薪酬和内外部薪酬差距对高管薪酬粘性的替代效应更强；与市场化程度更高的非国有企业和竞争类国有企业相比，非竞争类国有企业高管超额薪酬、内部薪酬差距对高管薪酬粘性的替代效应更强。

Based on a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, this paper explores the substitutive effects of relative compensation level on executive compensation stickiness and the moderator effects of internal supervision. Results show that executive excess compensation, executive-employee pay gaps, and external pay gaps all have substitutive effects on executive compensation stickiness. When the quality of internal control is high, the substitutive effects described above are stronger. Compared with competitive state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs with a higher degree of marketization, the substitutive effects of executive excess compensation and internal pay gaps on executive compensation stickiness are stronger in non-competitive SOEs.