在两条竞争的供应链下，通过构建Stackelberg博弈模型，研究政府不同的补贴政策（无补贴、单位成本补贴、绿色技术投资补贴）和消费者偏好如何影响新能源汽车企业的生态创新水平、利润及社会福利。研究表明：在给定的补贴政策下，当新能源汽车型消费者的比例增大或燃油汽车型消费者比例减小时，新能源汽车制造商的生态创新水平会提高；相比无补贴的情况，补贴提高了新能源汽车制造商的生态创新水平和利润；在政府补贴下，当新能源汽车型消费者的比例较大时，政府应提供单位成本补贴，反之提供绿色技术投资补贴。

By constructing a Stackelberg game model in two competing supply chains, this study investigates how the government subsidy policies (no subsidy, unit cost subsidy, and green technology investment subsidy) and consumer preference affect a new energy vehicles (NEVs) manufacturer’s eco-innovation level, profit, and social welfare. The results show that under a given subsidy policy, as the proportion of NEVs-oriented consumers increases or the proportion of oil-fueled vehicles consumers decreases, the NEVs manufacturer’s eco-innovation level increases. Furthermore, compared to the scenario without subsidy, the government subsidies increase the NEVs manufacturer’s eco-innovation level and profit. In the case of subsidies, when the proportion of NEVs consumers is high, the government should provide the unit cost subsidy, otherwise, it should provide the green technology investment subsidy.