针对需求信息不对称下供应商在零售平台上的渠道侵入策略选择问题，构建由供应商和零售平台构成的二级供应链信号博弈模型，探讨不侵入（仅使用平台分销）、承诺侵入（在平台订货前预先承诺寄售量）和延迟侵入（观察到零售平台订货量后决策寄售量）3种策略。研究表明：当零售平台佣金费率较低时，供应商偏好侵入寄售渠道；佣金费率较低且市场波动幅度较小时，延迟侵入为最优选择；其他情况下，供应商偏好承诺侵入。然而，依赖平台订货量作为需求信号进行决策并非总是有利，高履行成本或低需求波动时，忽视该信号对供应商更有利。

This study investigates a supplier’s channel encroachment strategy on a retail platform under asymmetric demand information. Within a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retail platform, we develop a signaling game model and examine three supplier strategies: no encroachment (using the platform only for distribution), committed encroachment (pre-committing to a consignment quantity before the platform places its order), and delayed encroachment (determining the consignment quantity after observing the platform’s order). The results show that when the platform’s commission rate is low, the supplier prefers encroachment. When commission rates are low and market fluctuations are small, delayed encroachment emerges as the optimal strategy. In other cases, committed encroachment is preferred. However, relying on the platform’s order quantity as a demand signal is not always beneficial. When fulfillment costs are high or demand variability is low, disregarding this signal yields greater advantage for the supplier.