为厘清政府欠款对民营企业创新的影响，以2016年国务院清理政府欠款专项督导行动为准自然实验，采用双重差分模型，考察专项督导行动对民营企业创新的影响与机制。研究发现，专项督导行动显著促进了民营企业的研发投入，且这一效应在地方政府财政压力较小、企业过度负债率较低、管理层股权激励期限较长时更加显著。机制检验方面，在验证专项督导行动直接降低企业应收账款的同时，发现专项督导行动在经营活动中提高了企业当期和未来的现金流流入，在筹资活动中提高了企业的银行可借贷总额，从整体上缓解了企业的融资约束和现金流压力，进而促进企业提高了研发投入。

To clarify the impact of delayed government debt on innovation of private enterprises, this paper uses the 2016 special supervision action on government debt as a quasi-natural experiment. A difference-in-differences model is employed to examine the impacts and mechanisms of the special supervision action on the Non-SOE innovation. The results indicate that the special supervision action significantly increases Non-SOE R&D investments, with more pronounced effects when the fiscal pressure of local government or corporate over-indebtedness is lower, and the duration of management option incentives is longer. In terms of mechanisms, while confirming that the special supervision action directly reduces the corporate receivables, this study finds that the action enhances the operating cash inflow in the current and future years, and increases the total borrowing capacity from banks, which alleviating financial constraints and cash flow pressures and promoting R&D investments.