基于“科技型制造商-零售商”构成的供应链系统，分别构建无补贴、针对消费者提供价格补贴和针对制造商提供研发补贴3种政策下的供应链企业博弈模型，探讨需求扰动下政府对科技型企业供应链的补贴策略选择问题。研究发现：当需求扰动幅度较大时，两种补贴政策均能有效刺激制造商提升研发水平；当需求扰动幅度较小时，价格补贴失效。当需求扰动幅度较大时，价格补贴策略能实现制造商利润最大化，而研发补贴策略对零售商利润和消费者剩余更有利；当需求扰动幅度较小时，两种补贴政策仅能增加制造商利润，并不会影响零售商利润和消费者剩余。

Based on a two-tier supply chain system consisting of “technology-based manufacturers and retailers”, this study constructs game-theoretic models under three policies: no subsidy, price subsidies for consumers, and research and development (R&D) subsidies for manufacturers. It explore the government’s choice of subsidy strategies for technology-based firm supply chain under demand disturbances. The findings indicate that when the demand disturbance amplitude is large, both subsidy strategies can effectively incentivize manufacturers to enhance R&D efforts. However, when the demand disturbance amplitude is small, the price subsidy strategy becomes ineffective. When the demand disturbance amplitude is large, the price subsidy strategy maximizes manufacturers’ profits, while the R&D subsidy strategy is more beneficial to retailers’ profits and consumer surplus. When the demand disturbance amplitude is small, both subsidy strategies only increase manufacturers’ profits and do not affect the retailers’ profit or consumer surplus.