通过构建无政府补贴、政府平等分配企业利润与消费者福利，以及按权重比例分配3种博弈模型，探究如何制定有效的补贴政策及合理的补贴水平，促进绿色创新产品的市场推广。研究发现：社会福利的变化并非随补贴增加而单调递增；在消费者焦虑水平较低或较高时，应提高补贴以激励购买，而在中等焦虑水平时则宜降低补贴；当消费者焦虑水平较低或适中时，补贴可有效引导消费者从传统产品转向绿色创新产品，但在高焦虑水平下补贴效果有限；若政府更重视企业利润，则更有利于绿色创新产品的市场推广。

By constructing three game-theory models—one without government subsidies, one with equal distribution of corporate profits and consumer welfare by the government, and one with weighted objective with proportional weights—this study aims to explore how to formulate effective subsidy policies and determine reasonable subsidy levels to promote the market adoption of green innovative products. The findings reveal that changes in social welfare are not monotonic in the subsidy level; when consumers’ anxiety levels are either low or high, subsidies should be increased to incentivize purchases, whereas when anxiety is at a medium level, subsidies should be reduced. Subsidies can effectively guide consumers to switch from traditional products to green innovative products when anxiety is low or moderate, but their effectiveness is limited under high anxiety levels. If the government places greater emphasis on corporate profits, it is more conducive to the market promotion of green innovative products.