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| Incentive of Professional Manager and Strategic Selection of Carbon Emission Reduction R&D in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain |
| LI Ximei，ZHOU Jianbo |
| 1.Guangdong University of Finance, Guangzhou, China；2.Guangzhou Institute of Science and Technology，Guangzhou, China |
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Abstract Considering a two-echelon supply chain under carbon trading policy, there are four combinations, including R&D competition and no cost sharing, R&D competition and cost sharing, R&D cooperation and no cost sharing, as well as R&D cooperation and cost sharing, that can be selected by two professional managers in two manufactures and a single retailer as the strategy of carbon emission reduction R&D. By constructing these four game models, this study investigates the supply chain’s strategic selection of carbon emission reduction R&D. Results show that form the views of increasing of emission reduction R&D and decreasing net carbon emission, the supply chain would not choose the strategy of R&D competition and no cost sharing, but may choose other strategies with different possibilities. From the view of increasing entire benefit of the supply chain, they may choose each strategy to different extent. As a whole, the supply chain would not choose R&D competition and no cost sharing, has a small probability to choose R&D competition and cost sharing or R&D cooperation and no cost sharing, and is more likely to choose R&D cooperation and cost sharing as their stable strategy of carbon emission reduction R&D.
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Received: 13 October 2021
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