Abstract：This paper takes the framework of principalagent model to analyze the influence of behavior traits，project property and information leakage on the choice of payment contract of R&D outsourcing. The results show that without information leakage, the principal can use fixed lumpsum payment contract to select R&D agent when the efforts of the agent are observable, but should use revenuesharing contract to undertake the R&D outsourcing when the efforts are unobservable. Moreover, the sharing revenue will be negatively related to the agent’s risk aversion, market uncertainty and the agent’s R&D efficiency. In the context of information leakage, the sharing revenue will be negatively associated to the project importance to the principal, and the complexity of the project. Also, the principal should adjust its revenue sharing ratio in accordance with the agent’s capability of capturing the leaking market.
杨治, 张俊. 企业研发外包的控制机制：信息泄露下的支付合同选择[J]. J4, 2012, 9(6): 863-.
YANG Zhi, ZHANG Jun. Control Mechanism of R&D Outsourcing: The Choice of Payment Contract
in Information Leakage Context. J4, 2012, 9(6): 863-.
2012, Vol. 9 
