Abstract：Aiming at a cloud service supply chain composed of one cloud application developer and one cloud platform operator, a signal game model and an information sharing model are constructed to compare and analyze the optimal security information disclosure strategies of the cloud platform operator under three scenarios: only insured, only certified, and both insured and certified, and the effects of cloud authentication on consumer surplus and social welfare are discussed. The research shows that signaling by the level of insurance can realize the separating equilibrium, but the cloud platform operator must bear the signaling cost when operating cost is less than its threshold. The cloud platform operator is profitable when cloud authentication brings users a high utility. Regardless of utility levels of cloud certification, the cloud platform operator prefers the dual strategy of both insurance and certification; and governmental subsidies for cloud certification can effectively enhance consumer surplus and total social welfare.
鲁馨蔓，付宇宁，王君，张博欣，李波. 投保抑或认证下云平台的安全信息披露策略研究[J]. 管理学报, 2024, 21(7): 1067-.
LU Xinman，FU Yuning，WANG Jun，ZHANG Boxin，LI Bo. Research on Security Disclosure Strategies for Cloud Platforms under Insurance or Certification. Chinese Journal of Management, 2024, 21(7): 1067-.
