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政府隐性补贴下的银行地方债配置
郑长军,陈诗颖,钱宁宇
1.华中科技大学管理学院; 2.浙江海洋大学经济与管理学院
Implicit Government Subsidy, Local Government Bond Pricing and Banks’ Local Bond Allocation
ZHENG Changjun,CHEN Shiying,QIAN Ningyu
1.Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, China;2.Zhejiang Ocean University, Zhoushan, Zhejiang, China

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摘要 基于多物品拍卖理论,研究地方政府和银行围绕地方债发行的博弈与互动。通过构建理论模型,研究发现:政府隐性补贴将提高地方债发行价格,但地方政府通过资源重新配置,增加参与银行的利润,促使银行配置更多的地方债,地方政府和银行的利益更紧密地捆绑在一起。地方政府只有在感知风险时,才会有选择地适度对地方债发行进行隐性补贴。地方政府有动力也有能力影响地方债发行价格,中央政府对地方官员追责的法规在某些情况下反而成为地方政府补贴的动机。因此,有必要进一步深化地方债务治理体制改革,优化银行资产配置,以构建良性的地方政银互动关系。
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郑长军
陈诗颖
钱宁宇
关键词 地方债定价 政府隐性补贴 银行资产配置 政银关系    
Abstract:On the basis of multi-unit auction theory, this study explores the collusion and games between local governments and banks around local government bonds. By constructing a theoretical model, the study finds that: the implicit government subsidy significantly reduces the issuance interest rate of local government bonds. However, local governments reintroduce profits outside tendering through local resources reconfiguration. Local governments subsidize the interest of the bidding banks and increase the profits of participating banks. Therefore, it enables the banks to allocate more local government bonds, which ties the interests of local governments and banks more closely. Under the current institutional arrangement, local governments will intervene in local bond issuance selectively and moderately only when risks are perceived. As collaborators, local governments have the incentive and ability to intervene in the issuance of local government bonds. In some cases, the regulations that central government holds local governments officials accountable have instead served as an incentive for local governments to intervene in bond issuance. Therefore, it is necessary to further deepen the reform of local debt governance system and optimize bank asset allocation, so as to build a benign interactive relationship between local governments and banks.
Key wordslocal government bond pricing    implicit government subsidy    bank asset allocation    government-bank relationship   
收稿日期: 2021-03-30     
基金资助:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71703047);中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2018T110748);江西省教育厅科学技术资助项目(181290)
通讯作者: 钱宁宇(1986~),男,河南郑州人。华中科技大学(武汉市 430074)管理学院副教授。研究方向为银行管理。     E-mail: qianningyu@hust.edu.cn
引用本文:   
郑长军,陈诗颖,钱宁宇. 政府隐性补贴下的银行地方债配置[J]. 管理学报, 2022, 19(9): 1399-. ZHENG Changjun,CHEN Shiying,QIAN Ningyu. Implicit Government Subsidy, Local Government Bond Pricing and Banks’ Local Bond Allocation. Chinese Journal of Management, 2022, 19(9): 1399-.
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