Using a sample of non-financial state-owned enterprises(SOEs)listed in China’s A-share market from 2013 to 2023,this study employs a staggered difference-in-differences model to examine the impact of the transfer of state-owned capital on executive pay-performance sensitivity in SOEs. The findings show that the transfer of state-owned capital significantly increases executive pay-performance sensitivity in SOEs by alleviating agency conflicts，thereby constraining managerial opportunistic behavior and by improving accounting information quality，thereby facilitating more effective compensation contracts. This effect is more pronounced in competitive SOEs, in firms where management does not hold equity stakes, and in SOEs located in regions with lower levels of marketization. Moreover, the governance effects of the three state-owned equity management models that emerge after the transfer, namely the social security fund model, the finance department model, and the state-owned assets supervision authority model, decrease successively in enhancing executive pay-performance sensitivity in SOEs. Notably, the transfer of state-owned capital exhibits a compensation-performance reference-point effect. When executive compensation and operating performance fall below their respective reference points, its strengthening effect on executive pay-performance sensitivity in SOEs becomes more pronounced. In addition, the transfer of state-owned capital curbs excessive perquisite consumption by executives in SOEs and increases dividend payouts in SOEs.