To investigate the optimal production and recycling strategies of manufacturers under value co-creation recycling and the dynamic diffusion process of the strategies, a two-layer game model combining Stackelberg games with small-world networks is established based on complex network game theory. Incorporating a dynamic carbon quota trading mechanism, the study analyzes the impact of three policy types—subsidies, deposit refunds, and dynamic incentives and penalties—on micro-level strategy making and diffusion of manufacturers. Results indicate: Consumer participation levels in value-co-creation recycling exert a nonlinear influence on the diffusion rate of manufacturers’ strategies. Subsidies face an incentive redundancy dilemma, struggling to sustain diffusion growth. Deposit refunds elevate diffusion to higher levels but yield lower micro-recycling rates than other models. Dynamic reward-punishment mechanisms achieve win-win at micro and macro levels, driving manufacturers to achieve the peak of micro-recycling rates and value co-creation recycling strategies diffusion simultaneously. This approach delivers optimal outcomes by integrating regulatory push with incentive pull.