Using the random inspection system implemented by CSRC, this paper examines the impact of risk-free oriented regulation on creditors’pricing decisions. The results show that creditors demand higher risk premiums after listed companies are randomly inspected, supporting the risk disclosing effect. Mechanism analysis finds that random inspections will uncover companies’ illegal and irregular problems, which will lead auditors, exchanges, and the media continuously reveal negative information about the company, and the listed companies themselves also increase the disclosure level of negative information, therefore increase creditors’ risk perception and risk premiums. Cross-sectional analysis finds that the positive effect of random inspection on creditors’ pricing decisions is more pronounced for firms with higher information content in the CSRC’s penalty announcements, lower information transparency, or weaker asset mortgage capacity. Meanwhile, after listed companies are randomly inspected, not only creditors but also suppliers will reduce their credit scale. In addition, creditors do not raise the risk premium after a listed company is subjected to a follow-up random inspection.