为探究价值共创回收下制造商生产、回收最优决策及策略动态扩散过程，基于复杂网络博弈理论，建立由Stackelberg博弈与小世界网络相结合的双层博弈模型，并纳入动态碳配额交易机制，分析补贴、押金返还及动态奖惩3类政策对制造商微观决策与策略扩散的影响。研究发现：消费者价值共创回收参与水平对制造商策略扩散度呈非线性影响；补贴面临激励冗余困境，难以促进扩散度持续增加；押金返还提升扩散度至更高水平，但微观回收率低于其他模式；动态奖惩机制实现微观和宏观层面双赢，促使制造商微观回收率与价值共创回收策略扩散度同步达峰值，依托规制推力与激励拉力发挥最佳效果。

To investigate the optimal production and recycling strategies of manufacturers under value co-creation recycling and the dynamic diffusion process of the strategies, a two-layer game model combining Stackelberg games with small-world networks is established based on complex network game theory. Incorporating a dynamic carbon quota trading mechanism, the study analyzes the impact of three policy types—subsidies, deposit refunds, and dynamic incentives and penalties—on micro-level strategy making and diffusion of manufacturers. Results indicate: Consumer participation levels in value-co-creation recycling exert a nonlinear influence on the diffusion rate of manufacturers’ strategies. Subsidies face an incentive redundancy dilemma, struggling to sustain diffusion growth. Deposit refunds elevate diffusion to higher levels but yield lower micro-recycling rates than other models. Dynamic reward-punishment mechanisms achieve win-win at micro and macro levels, driving manufacturers to achieve the peak of micro-recycling rates and value co-creation recycling strategies diffusion simultaneously. This approach delivers optimal outcomes by integrating regulatory push with incentive pull.