基于企业投资理论，利用中国沪深A股2010～2022年制造业企业样本，探究过度负债对制造业企业金融资产投资的影响。研究发现，过度负债通过提高融资约束、加剧委托代理冲突进而驱动制造业企业金融资产投资。从投资动机看，逐利性动机是过度负债驱动金融资产投资的主要动机；从投资效率看，过度负债驱动金融资产投资是非效率的，并且存在过度投资趋势，从一定程度上说明了制造业企业有“脱实向虚”的倾向。异质性分析表明，过度负债对制造业企业金融资产投资的促进效应在外部审计监督不力、要素市场扭曲更强、成本转嫁能力更低，以及宏观经济波动更小的情境中表现更明显。

Based on corporate investment theory, using a sample of manufacturing firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets in China from 2010 to 2022, this study explores the impact of over-indebtedness on the financial asset investments of these firms. The findings reveal that over-indebtedness drives financial asset investments in manufacturing firms by increasing financing constraints and intensifying principal-agent conflicts. From the perspective of investment motivation, profit-seeking is identified as the primary motive behind over-indebtedness-driven financial asset investments. In terms of investment efficiency, such investments are found to be inefficient and exhibit a trend of over-investment, which to some extent indicates a tendency for manufacturing firms to “shift from the real economy to the virtual economy”. Heterogeneity analysis shows that the promoting effect of over-indebtedness on financial asset investments in manufacturing firms is more pronounced under conditions of weak external audit supervision, greater distortion in factor markets, lower cost pass-through capabilities, and smaller macroeconomic fluctuations.