以新三板2013~2021年风险资本标的企业为样本，探究业绩承诺契约签订对初创企业创新的影响。研究表明，业绩承诺契约签订会导致企业创新产出下降。机制分析结果显示，签订业绩承诺契约后企业决策更加注重价值实现而非价值创造，具体表现为研发投入与研发员工比例降低，以及销售费用与销售员工比例上升。情境因素分析发现，公司治理水平低、经营环境不确定性高的企业签订业绩承诺契约后创新产出下降更为明显。进一步研究发现，风险资本通过派驻董事参与治理能够发挥信息效应，提升了风险资本对于失败的容忍度，对企业创新具有积极影响。

This study uses venture-capital-backed enterprises listed on the National Equities Exchange and Quotations from 2013 to 2021 as a sample to investigate how signing valuation adjustment mechanism agreements influences startup innovation. The result show that entering into these agreements leads to a significant reduction in firms’ innovation output. Mechanism analysis reveals that after signing the agreements, firms prioritize value realization over value creation in their decision making, as evidenced by a decrease in the R&D investment and the proportion of R&D personnel, accompanied by an increase in the proportion of selling expenses and sales staff. Heterogeneity tests show the innovation decline is more pronounced for firms with weak corporate governance and high operating environmental uncertainty after signing the agreements. Extended analysis further finds that venture capitalists exert an “information effect” by appointing directors to the board, which raises their tolerance for failure, generating a positive impact on corporate innovation.