以2007～2022年沪深A股上市公司为样本，从非监管型治理视角探究供应链信用融资对企业违规的影响。研究表明：稳定充足的供应链信用融资对企业违规具有抑制作用。机制识别表明，供应链信用融资经由3条路径传递积极信号约束企业违规。进一步研究发现：准自然实验回归结果证实了“一带一路”建设在供应链信用融资抑制企业违规中的正向政策效应；非国有企业与供应链集中度较高的企业，供应链信用融资对企业违规的抑制作用更为显著；分析师关注与供应链信用融资存在互补效应，增强了供应链信用融资对企业违规的抑制作用；高管团队变更与供应链信用融资存在替代效应，削弱了供应链信用融资对企业违规的抑制作用。

Using A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2022 as samples, this study explores the impact of supply chain credit financing on corporate violations from a non-regulatory governance perspective. The results show that stable and sufficient supply chain credit financing has a restraining effect on corporate violations. Mechanism identification reveals that supply chain credit financing conveys positive signals through three pathways to constrain corporate violations. Further research finds that quasi-natural experiment regression results confirm the positive policy effect of the “Belt and Road” initiative in enhancing the restraining role of supply chain credit financing on corporate violations. The inhibitory effect of supply chain credit financing on corporate violations is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises and firms with higher supply chain concentration. Analyst coverage exhibits a complementary effect with supply chain credit financing, strengthening its restraining impact on corporate violations. In contrast, executive team turnover shows a substitution effect with supply chain credit financing, weakening its inhibitory effect on corporate violations.