Abstract This paper studies the moderating effect of different ultimate controller of listed companies on the relationship between the quantity and the maturity structure of bank loans and their investment behavior in order to reveal the integrative effects of the shareholdercreditor agency conflict and the bank loans as a governance mechanism on the investments. Studies have shown that: i) in general, there is a significant negative correlation between bank lending and investment spending, and shortterm borrowing can exert a more binding force than the longterm borrowing for investment expansion; ii) whether the ultimate controller is state or nonstate, the shortterm debt can constraint the investment expansion more obvious than that of the longterm loan, but in the companies ultimately controlled by the country, the longterm borrowing show the more incentive for the overinvestment; iii) the shortterm borrowings play a role in binding in companies controlled by the central government, but the longterm does not; iv) there isn’t significant relationship between shortterm borrowings and investment behaviors, but there is a significant relation between longterm debt and overinvestment.
|