管理学报
  Jul. 14, 2025
Home |  About Journal  |  Editorial Board  |  Instruction  |  Subscriptions  |  Advertisement  |  Contacts Us  |  Chinese
J4  2009, Vol. 6 Issue (3): 321-    DOI:
Current Issue| Next Issue| Archive| Adv Search |
Analysis of Bidding Equilibrium and Revenue of Three Types of Auctions under Online Fraud
 JI Shu-Xian, ZHONG Bin, Hu-Pei
Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu, China

Download: PDF (127 KB)   HTML (1 KB) 
Export: BibTeX | EndNote (RIS)      
Abstract  

English auction, first-price sealed-bid, and second-price sealed-bid auction are three common online auctions. Their characters and the probable cheating styles under each auction were discussed. The honest bidder's winning probability and their Nash equilibrium strategy under each auction were analyzed and their expected gain and the honest seller's revenue loss were calculated. After the results compared,  some general conclusions are given, including the relationships among the bidder's expected gain, the seller's revenue loss, the number of the bidders, the cheating probability and the evaluation functions,  It is also indicated that the bidders can gain the maximal expected revenue and the sellers get the minimal expected revenue loss under English auction. So  English auction is the popular auction under the online fraud.

Key wordsonline auction      online fraud      bidding equilibrium strategy      expected revenue     
Received: 25 September 2007     
Service
E-mail this article
Add to my bookshelf
Add to citation manager
E-mail Alert
RSS
Articles by authors
JI Shu-Xian
ZHONG Bin
Hu-Pei
Cite this article:   
JI Shu-Xian,ZHONG Bin,Hu-Pei. Analysis of Bidding Equilibrium and Revenue of Three Types of Auctions under Online Fraud[J]. J4, 2009, 6(3): 321-.
URL:  
http://manu68.magtech.com.cn/Jwk_glxb/EN/     OR     http://manu68.magtech.com.cn/Jwk_glxb/EN/Y2009/V6/I3/321
Copyright  ©  CHINESE JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT
Support by Beijing Magtech Co.ltd   support@magtech.com.cn