管理学报
  Jul. 14, 2025
Home |  About Journal  |  Editorial Board  |  Instruction  |  Subscriptions  |  Advertisement  |  Contacts Us  |  Chinese
J4  2010, Vol. 7 Issue (7): 993-    DOI:
Current Issue| Next Issue| Archive| Adv Search |
Ratchet Effect of Compensation and the Choice of Relative Performance Evaluation
 XIAO Ji-Hui, PENG Wen-Ping
1.Jinan University,  Guangzhou, China; 2. Southern Normal University, Guangzhou, China

Download: PDF (193 KB)   HTML (1 KB) 
Export: BibTeX | EndNote (RIS)      
Abstract  
In this paper, we make empirical analysis of the relationship between general manager's compensation and performance of corporation, and found out that ROE and RET have significant positive effect on compensation; however, there are lack of sensitivity between compensation and performance. We argue that the existence of ratchet effect is one of the reasons that result in the lack of sensitivity of compensation and performance. In addition, we exam the existence and way of ratchet effect and found out that the ratchet effect based on aggregate stock price performance of business with same size and industry does not exist. We conclude that the application of RPE model, in which the chosen referring performance is aggregate performance of the business of same size and industry, can avoid the influence of ratchet effect on general manager's compensation contract and increase the efficiency of compensation contract.
Key words     
Received: 19 December 2008     
Service
E-mail this article
Add to my bookshelf
Add to citation manager
E-mail Alert
RSS
Articles by authors
XIAO Ji-Hui
PENG Wen-Ping
Cite this article:   
XIAO Ji-Hui,PENG Wen-Ping.
Ratchet Effect of Compensation and the Choice of Relative Performance Evaluation
[J]. J4, 2010, 7(7): 993-.
URL:  
http://manu68.magtech.com.cn/Jwk_glxb/EN/     OR     http://manu68.magtech.com.cn/Jwk_glxb/EN/Y2010/V7/I7/993
Copyright  ©  CHINESE JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT
Support by Beijing Magtech Co.ltd   support@magtech.com.cn