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Abstract From the perspective of flexible tax law enforcement, this study depicts flexible tax enforcement with the quasi-natural experiment of the list system of “no punishment for first violation” implemented by the tax department. This study selects the entrepreneurial listed companies of China’s SME and GEM board as samples to empirically test the impact of flexible tax enforcement on corporate cooperative tax compliance and its impact mechanism. The results show that the flexible tax enforcement improves the degree of corporate cooperative tax compliance. And the mechanism test shows that flexible tax enforcement promotes the corporate cooperative tax compliance by improving the law enforcement efficiency of tax department and reducing operating risks of corporate. Further research finds that flexible tax enforcement plays a more significant role in improving the degree of corporate cooperative tax compliance in areas with high level of the rule of law, high level of marketization, and high level of tax personnel’s ability.
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Received: 01 June 2022
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