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Abstract Considering an offline to online (O2O) supply chain consisting of an online retailer and a showroom under asymmetry cost information, principal-agent models are established with asymmetric cost information and full information respectively. The optimal commission contract is proposed under information asymmetry and the properties of the optimal commission contract are analyzed. Further, the impacts of asymmetry cost information on the profit of the online retailer, the showroom and the whole O2O supply chain are analyzed. The results show that, the purpose to design the commission contract varies from the types of showrooms. In conclusion, the existence of asymmetry information leads to the change of commission contract parameters, while the asymmetry information may not decrease the performance of O2O supply chain or generates extra information rent.
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Received: 23 November 2016
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2017, Vol. 14 
