Abstract：Establishing a collaborative innovation system among the new energy battery enterprises is an important way to accelerate the development of strategic emerging industries. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, cobalt mining enterprise, and new energy battery enterprise; and then analyzes the behavior choices and equilibrium states of the three parties in the collaborative innovation process. The results show that there are two evolutionary equilibrium points in the collaborative innovation system among the government, cobalt mining enterprise, and new energy enterprise. The higher the initial willingness of the game subject, the faster the system evolves toward a stable state. The benefits brought by collaborative innovation can effectively improve the willingness of enterprises to participate in collaborative innovation. However, the sensitivity of enterprises’ strategy selection to market environment factors—such as technological innovation benefits, the proportion of cobalt raw materials from battery recycling, and battery recycling volume—varies. When the cost for enterprises to build a collaborative innovation information platform is controllable, enterprises’ collaborative innovation exerts a positive impact on the collaborative innovation system.
李静远，成金华，胡珮琪. 基于三方演化博弈的新能源电池企业协同创新机制研究[J]. 管理学报, 2025, 22(10): 1909-.
LI Jingyuan，CHENG Jinhua，HU Peiqi. Study on Collaborative Innovation Mechanism of New Energy Battery Enterprise Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game. Chinese Journal of Management, 2025, 22(10): 1909-.
