Abstract：This study takes drug group purchasing organization (GPO) and two public healthcare institutions as research objects. Considering the influence of the public welfare of healthcare institutions, this study constructs supply chain game models dominated by GPO and healthcare institutions, respectively. By comparing and analyzing the equilibrium results of the game, the effects of different power structures on drug accessibility, supply chain performance, and social welfare are revealed. The results indicate that: first, when the volume discount rates are significant high, increasing public welfare within a specific range can increase the profit of healthcare institutions. Second, group purchasing is more likely to be formed with healthcare institutions taking the lead when volume discount rates are low, and with GPO taking the lead when volume discount rates are significant high. Third, from the optimal perspective of the supply chain profit and social welfare, when the volume discount rates are lower and the public benefit is lower, the healthcare institution-led is better than the GPO-led, while the GPO-led is better when the public benefit is higher; when the volume discount rates are more significant high, the healthcare institution-led is always better than the GPO-led.
李诗杨，葛宇峰，孔前前，周楠. 公益性导向下考虑市场权力结构的药品集团采购策略选择[J]. 管理学报, 2025, 22(6): 1171-.
LI Shiyang，GE Yufeng，KONG Qianqian，ZHOU Nan. Strategic Choice of Drug Group Purchasing Considering Market Power Structure under Public Benefit Orientation. Chinese Journal of Management, 2025, 22(6): 1171-.
