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| Monitoring, Learning and Reputation: An Experimental Investigation on Alliance Stability |
| GAO Yan-Hui, WAN Di-Fang, GUO Hai-Xing |
| 1. Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an, China;
2. Shanxi Regional Electric Power Group Co. LTD, Xi’an， China |
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Abstract Using experimental economics method for reference, this paper analyzes the impact of regulation, mutual learning, reputation and the interplay of them on alliance success. The experiment is based on prisoner dilemma game, which denotes the coopetition of alliance partners. We control monitoring and introduce learning and reputation step by step to compare their impacts. The experimental results indicate that regulation has notable effect on inhibiting opportunity behavior in alliance, yet high costly. Mutual learning can inhibit opportunity behavior more and reduce regulation cost. However, in virtue of mutual learning the learner in alliance may avoid the risk of punishment while regulation is strict and take opportunity behavior to gain shortterm excess income while regulation is deficient. Reputation makes alliance partners reluctant or dare not to take opportunity behavior and the side effect of mutual learning is eliminated.
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Received: 01 September 2011
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2012, Vol. 9 
