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J4  2010, Vol. 7 Issue (3): 412-    DOI:
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Negotiation Game between Manufacturers and Monopoly Supplier Under Noncooperation State
 ZHENG Jin-Rong, XU Fu-Yuan
1.Shanghai Ocean University, Shanghai, China;  2. University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai, China

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Abstract  

We set up a two-stage supply chain and raise the negotiation game models between monopoly supplier and manufacturers under non-cooperation state. By backward induction method, we solve the equilibrium solutions of monopoly supplier and manufacturers. We prove that monopoly supplier prefer to choose manufacturers with low production cost to negotiates with. Meanwhile, we also analyze the influence of manufacturers' technical efficiency difference on non-cooperation equilibrium state. If the technical efficiency difference of two manufacturers is disparate, the market will appear the stable non-cooperation equilibrium state. If the technical efficiency difference is close, manufacturers will contest the right of negotiation with monopoly supplier in the short -term.

Key wordsmanufacturer      monopoly supplier      non-cooperation game      discount      backward induction     
Received: 11 December 2008     
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ZHENG Jin-Rong
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ZHENG Jin-Rong,XU Fu-Yuan. Negotiation Game between Manufacturers and Monopoly Supplier Under Noncooperation State[J]. J4, 2010, 7(3): 412-.
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