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| E-Platforms’ Bargaining Modes Selection under Goods and Service Competition |
| LI Hui，XU Qi |
| Donghua University, Shanghai, China |
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Abstract Considering that e-platforms possess bargaining power, this study explores the issue of e-platforms’ bargaining mode selection in the bargaining game with the manufacturer. The impact of differences in platform bargaining power on the equilibrium outcomes of platform supply chains is comparatively analyzed under different bargaining modes, including separate bargaining and collective bargaining. The research results indicate that: ①Enhancing the platform’s bargaining power can reduce procurement costs and promote the platform to lower the retail price of products, and achieve higher profitability. ②With the continuous improvement of the e-platform’s bargaining power, the e-platform will reduce the operational service level in separate bargaining, while increasing the operational service level in collective bargaining. ③The implementation of the collective bargaining model has certain prerequisites. A bargaining alliance between e-platforms will only be formed when the bargaining power of one e-platform exceeds a certain threshold. ④In contrast to the separate bargaining, when the service cost coefficient is significantly reduced, both e-platforms can achieve an increase in their own profits in the Leader-based collective bargaining mode.
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Received: 09 May 2024
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