Abstract This study employs a dynamic evolutionary game theory to develop four distinct mechanisms: static reward and punishment, dynamic rewards with static punishments, static rewards with dynamic punishment, and dynamic reward and punishment. It theoretically analyses the system stability of emergency supply production strategies under these varying reward and punishment frameworks and performs a detailed sensitivity analysis of the parameters involved. The results indicate that the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism yields the highest system stability, while the dynamic reward with static punishment mechanism proves the least stable. In a scenario where optimizing government regulatory costs is challenging, simply increasing production incentives for companies does not necessarily promote honest production practices. Conversely, enhancing the severity of penalties for fraudulent practices significantly encourages companies to engage in genuine production of emergency materials.
WANG Yue,LIU Ming,CAO Jie. Quality Governance of Emergency Supplies under Different Reward and Punishment Mechanisms[J]. Chinese Journal of Management, 2025, 22(5): 938-.
