Abstract This study constructs a game-theoretic model involving of a merchant, an e-commerce platform, and a third-party cashback website, and explores the e-commerce transformation strategies of the cashback website and the corresponding response strategies of the platform. The research reveals: For the cashback website, when both the commission rate and the utility discount factor of its e-commerce channel are high, while both the cashback amount provided by the merchant to the cashback website and the cashback amount provided by the cashback website to consumers are relatively low, the cashback website should introduce the e-commerce channel; then, the platform will permit it to continue participating in the cashback promotion. When both the commission rate and the utility discount factor of the cashback website’s e-commerce channel are high and the cashback provided by the merchant is relatively moderate, the cashback website should still introduce the e-commerce channel even if the platform prohibits its continued participation in the cashback promotion after the introduction. Regarding the platform, it will suffer losses when the cashback website introduces the e-commerce channel. However, if the cashback amount provided by the merchant is relatively moderate and the cashback amount provided by the cashback website is relatively high, or if the cashback amount provided by the merchant is relatively low, the platform should allow the cashback website to continue participating in the cashback promotion.
HUANG Junwei,MEI Shue,ZHONG Weijun. E-Commerce Transformation of a Third-Party Cashback Website and Responses of an E-Commerce Platform[J]. Chinese Journal of Management, 2025, 22(4): 719-.
